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Abstract 
Legal scholars have postulated that there have been 
three eras of American law to-date, consisting in 
chronological order of the initial Age of Discovery, the 
Age of Faith, and then the Age of Anxiety. An open 
question that has received erudite attention in legal 
studies is what the next era, the fourth era, might 
consist of, and for which various proposals exist 
including examples such as the Age of Consent, the 
Age of Information, etc. There is no consensus in the 
literature as yet on what the fourth era is, and nor 
whether the fourth era has already begun or will 
instead emerge in the future. This paper examines the 
potential era-elucidating impacts amid the advent of 
autonomous Artificial Intelligence Legal Reasoning 
(AILR), entailing whether such AILR will be an 
element of a fourth era or a driver of a fourth, fifth, or 
perhaps the sixth era of American law. Also, a set of 
meta-characteristics about the means of identifying a 
legal era changeover are introduced, along with an 
innovative discussion of the role entailing legal 
formalism versus legal realism in the emergence of the 
American law eras. 
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1 Background on Eras of American Law 
 
In Section 1 of this paper, the eras of American law 
are introduced and addressed. Doing so establishes the 
groundwork for the subsequent sections. Section 2 
introduces the Levels of Autonomy (LoA) of AI Legal 
Reasoning (AILR), which is instrumental in the 
discussions undertaken in Section 3. Section 3 
provides an indication of the eras of American law as 
it applies to the LoA AILR. Section 4 provides various 
additional considerations and recommendations. 
 
This paper then consists of these four sections: 
• Section 1: Background on Eras of 
                 American Law 
• Section 2: Autonomous Levels of  
                        AI Legal Reasoning 
• Section 3: Next Eras and Autonomous 
                 AI Legal Reasoning 
• Section 4: Additional Considerations and 
                 Future Research 
 
1.1 Three Eras of American Law 
 
The history of American law has been extensively 
studied and analyzed (see for example [29] [34] [60]). 
In the 1970s, legal scholar Grant Gilmore [32] 
proposed that the history of American law could be 
stratified into three distinct eras.  
 
The first era was coined as the Age of Discovery and 
occurred from the 1800s until the Civil War, during 
which there was an initial formulation of a legal 
edifice for America. This was based to a great extent 
on the reuse of English common law, inexorably being 
shorn into a stylized and substantive instantiation that 
would become uniquely American law.  
 
The second era lasted from the Civil War until WWI 
and was named as the Age of Faith. During this era, 
there was a purported attempt to perceive and shape 
the law as a form of rigorous science, out of which 
there were presumably legal truths that could 
axiomatically be discovered and derived. It was said to 
be a time when one ought to have utter faith that the 
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law was right and just since it was essentially 
scientifically provable as such.  
 
The third era arose following WWI and is referred to 
as the Age of Anxiety, and, when Gilmore wrote about 
these eras, he indicated that the Age of Anxiety was 
still underway. The anxiety being spurred as a 
realization that the faith in legal truths was mislaid and 
could no longer adequately serve as a foundational 
structure for understanding and maturation of the field 
of law. 
 
As will be later discussed in this paper, there have 
been subsequent suggestions that we are either now in 
a fourth era or perhaps on the verge of such [7] [44], 
and thus it could be that we are already past the third 
era and into the fourth era. On the other hand, there 
does not appear to be any preponderance of agreement 
or consensus in the legal literature that a fourth era is 
indeed already taking place. Ergo, for purposes of this 
discussion herein, we assume that we are still in the 
third era and that the nature, timing, and impacts of a 
fourth era are not as yet collectively ascertained and 
nor cast into stone, as it were. 
 
It is instructive to take a somewhat closer look at the 
considered prevailing three eras, doing so via the 
analyses and interpretations that have been made by 
legal scholars subsequent to Gilmore’s groundbreaking 
book. On a related note, it can be said that the book 
was groundbreaking, though it is also notable to 
emphasize that Gilmore’s work was based on the 
earlier efforts of Llewellyn [39]. Thus, it is significant 
and appropriate to saliently point out that Gilmore too 
indicates that his articulation of the three eras was 
based on the earlier work of Karl Llewellyn (from his 
respective book of 1960). Throughout the discussion 
herein, the primary reference for the three eras is based 
on Gilmore, though at the same time it is rightfully 
noteworthy to point out the earlier work by Llewellyn. 
 
Consider the analysis by Webster [59] concerning 
Gilmore’s eras. Per Webster: “The initial Age of 
Discovery, lasting from the early nineteenth century to 
the Civil War, is said to have been a golden age, 
likened perhaps somewhat excessively-to the period of 
late sixteenth century English theater or late eighteenth 
century Viennese music. It was an age when a 
society's best minds (for no particular reason) naturally 
gravitated towards a particular endeavor: the creation 
of an American legal system.”  
Especially well-known historical figures and legal 
jurists such as John Marshall, Joseph Story, and 
Lemuel Shaw are representative of this first era. 
 
The second era was prompted by a slew of factors, as 
Webster [59] states: “As is often the case, golden ages 
flourish briefly and then disappear as new political, 
social, and economic realities overtake them. Such was 
the case with American law at about the time of the 
Civil War. The fluidity, innovation and imagination 
which had created the new system of American law 
were replaced by a far more formalistic system 
emphasizing stability, certainty, and predictability.”  
 
This shift towards greater formalism has been depicted 
as an assumption that the law could be cast as a type of 
science and therefore embody the corresponding 
rigors, as per Webster [59], some believed that the law 
was “capable of being synthesized or reduced to basic 
truths or principles which, like laws of physics or 
chemistry, could be used as the criteria for legal 
decision-making.” This has been coined as the era of 
faith, meaning having a kind of righteousness faith in 
the law and believing without reservation that it was 
only a matter of scientifically discovering and 
codifying irrefutable and immutable laws. 
 
Bobbitt [7] points out that the “Age of Faith lasted 
from the Civil War through World War I, and was 
notable for the Olympian status it accorded law and its 
demigods, including Christopher Columbus Langdell 
and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. Langdell believed that 
law was a science from which scientific truths could 
be derived, and even the skeptical Holmes, according 
to Gilmore, refined and judicialized Langdellianism.” 
Webster equally points out that the law as science was 
replaced or desired to be replaced with an indication 
that law is a social science. There is some ongoing 
debate about whether the third era is therefore a 
complete rejection and departure of the second era, or 
perhaps a refinement, demonstrably so, and a shift 
toward a greater realism about the law. 
 
This is how Gilmore expresses the semblance of the 
third era [32]:  
 
“As lawyers we will do well to be on our guard 
against any suggestion that, through law, our society 
can be reformed, purified or saved. The function of 
law, in a society like our own, is altogether more 
modest and less apocalyptic. It is to provide a 
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mechanism for the settlement of disputes in the light 
of broadly conceived principles on whose 
soundness, it must be assumed, there is a general 
consensus among us. If the assumption is wrong, if 
there is no consensus, then we are headed for war, 
civil strife, and revolution, and the orderly 
administration of justice will become an irrelevant, 
nostalgic whimsy until the social fabric has been 
stitched together again and a new consensus has 
emerged.” 
 
Subsequent to Gilmore’s book there have been 
extensive and ongoing deliberations about the naming 
used to reflect the three eras.  
 
As pointed out by Webster [59]: “His book runs the 
risk of being criticized for affixing catchwords to time 
periods for which other and perhaps better names have 
already been given-liberalism, activism, and 
progressivism are just a few.” In whatever manner the 
eras might be so coined, there seems little doubt about 
the importance of pointing out the eras per se and 
engaging in an overarching discussion about the 
evolution of America law, per Bobbitt [7]: “Gilmore’s 
lectures satisfied and mesmerized their audience, and 
they were soon fashioned into a book, also titled The 
Ages of American Law, which became a foundational 
text for introducing law students to American legal 
studies.” 
 
In brief, the three eras as postulated seem to have 
become relatively accepted by the legal literature. 
Undoubtedly, arguments can be made as to whether 
these are the “right” eras and that perhaps the 
American law timeline period can be sliced in a 
different fashion. For example, suppose there have 
been ten eras, brandishing this notion as a provocative 
point of conjecture, or that there has only been one era 
and it has lasted since the beginnings of American law. 
Such provocateur outside-the-box considerations are 
not in the scope of this paper and it is taken at face 
value that there have been three eras and those three 
eras are reasonably stated and depicted by Gilmore 
and others that have similarly allied with the generally 
accepted stratification. 
 
 
1.1 Important Influence of Legal Realism 
 
Another notable perspective on the three eras is that 
they are all interconnected by an at-times hidden 
underlying variable. The postulated crux of the three 
eras has to do with the philosophical milieu known as 
legal formalism, which, in short, legal formalism can 
be defined as [20]: “A theory that legal rules stand 
separate from other social and political institutions. 
According to this theory, once lawmakers produce 
rules, judges apply them to the facts of a case without 
regard to social interests and public policy.” In 
contrast, there is legal realism, defined as [20]: “A 
theory that all law derives from prevailing social 
interests and public policy.  According to this 
theory, judges consider not only abstract rules, but also 
social interests and public policy when deciding a 
case.” 
 
In the prevailing implications of the three eras, the first 
era was a mild form of legal formalism but that was 
grappling with establishing the new American law and 
thus only modestly embraced such formalism precepts, 
while the second era was a dramatic extension and 
gravitation toward legal formalism, and then the third 
era a kind of retreat from legal formalism in place of 
alternatively embracing legal realism.  
 
Per Webster [59]: “Had those early legal figures 
instead adopted a formalistic approach to the problem 
of creating a new law for America, they would have 
sought to adopt the far more static and fixed principles 
of English common law and the English legal system. 
To an extent, of course, this happened. But for reasons 
relating, in part, to political and social hostility 
towards the utilization of an English system, English 
common law and, more importantly, the English 
approach to law were not simply imported to these 
shores without question. Because those early lawyers 
were not formalists, an innovative, creative and 
uniquely American system arose.” And, as already 
cited in the prior subsection [59], the second era was a 
flourishing of legal formalism: “The fluidity, 
innovation and imagination which had created the new 
system of American law were replaced by a far more 
formalistic system emphasizing stability, certainty, and 
predictability.”  
 
And then, the third era, as described accordingly by 
Bobbitt [7]: “After that came the Age of Anxiety, 
Gilmore’s own era, an Age when legal realism gnawed 
through the core assumptions of the Age of Faith and 
the nation groped unsuccessfully for new creeds to 
replace them.” 
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The legal profession and legal scholars continue to 
debate the merits of legal formalism versus legal 
realism. Perhaps one of the most infamous 
euphemisms about the law is that supposedly a good 
lawyer knows the law, while a great lawyer knows the 
judge. In this paper, we do not address this at times 
acrimonious discourse and simply acknowledge that 
these matters are still being examined and assessed by 
ongoing legal research. In any case, if one is seeking a 
measure or barometer toward identifying the pattern 
underlying the eras, it could be reasonably argued that 
the degree of legal formalism has been crucial if not a 
predominant factor at play. This will be further 
explored in Section 3. 
 
The next section of this paper introduces the 
autonomous levels of AI Legal Reasoning, doing so to 
then aid Section 3. Section 3 explores how the eras of 
American law and the elucidations of the fourth era 
can be explored in light of the autonomous levels of 
AI Legal Reasoning. Section 4 provides some 
conclusionary remarks and also an indication of 
recommended future research. 
 
2 Autonomous Levels of AI Legal Reasoning 
 
In this section, a framework for the autonomous levels 
of AI Legal Reasoning is summarized and is based on 
the research described in detail in Eliot [20].  
 
These autonomous levels will be portrayed in a grid 
that aligns with key elements of autonomy and as 
matched to AI Legal Reasoning. Providing this context 
will be useful to the later sections of this paper and 
will be utilized accordingly. 
 
The autonomous levels of AI Legal Reasoning are as 
follows: 
Level 0: No Automation for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 1: Simple Assistance Automation for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 2: Advanced Assistance Automation for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 3: Semi-Autonomous Automation for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 4: Domain Autonomous for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 5: Fully Autonomous for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 6: Superhuman Autonomous for AI Legal Reasoning 
2.1 Details of the LoA AILR 
 
See Figure A-1 for an overview chart showcasing the 
autonomous levels of AI Legal Reasoning as via 
columns denoting each of the respective levels. 
 
See Figure A-2 for an overview chart similar to Figure 
A-1 which alternatively is indicative of the 
autonomous levels of AI Legal Reasoning via the rows 
as depicting the respective levels (this is simply a 
reformatting of Figure A-1, doing so to aid in 
illuminating this variant perspective, but does not 
introduce any new facets or alterations from the 
contents as already shown in Figure A-1). 
 
 
2.1.1 Level 0: No Automation for AI Legal 
Reasoning 
 
Level 0 is considered the no automation level. Legal 
reasoning is carried out via manual methods and 
principally occurs via paper-based methods.  
 
This level is allowed some leeway in that the use of 
say a simple handheld calculator or perhaps the use of 
a fax machine could be allowed or included within this 
Level 0, though strictly speaking it could be said that 
any form whatsoever of automation is to be excluded 
from this level. 
 
 
2.1.2 Level 1: Simple Assistance Automation 
for AI Legal Reasoning 
 
Level 1 consists of simple assistance automation for 
AI legal reasoning.  
 
Examples of this category encompassing simple 
automation would include the use of everyday 
computer-based word processing, the use of everyday 
computer-based spreadsheets, the access to online 
legal documents that are stored and retrieved 
electronically, and so on. 
 
By-and-large, today’s use of computers for legal 
activities is predominantly within Level 1. It is 
assumed and expected that over time, the 
pervasiveness of automation will continue to deepen 
and widen, and eventually lead to legal activities being 
supported and within Level 2, rather than Level 1. 
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2.1.3 Level 2: Advanced Assistance Automation 
for AI Legal Reasoning 
 
Level 2 consists of advanced assistance automation for 
AI legal reasoning. 
 
Examples of this notion encompassing advanced 
automation would include the use of query-style 
Natural Language Processing (NLP), Machine 
Learning (ML) for case predictions, and so on. 
 
Gradually, over time, it is expected that computer-
based systems for legal activities will increasingly 
make use of advanced automation. Law industry 
technology that was once at a Level 1 will likely be 
refined, upgraded, or expanded to include advanced 
capabilities, and thus be reclassified into Level 2. 
 
2.1.4 Level 3: Semi-Autonomous Automation 
for AI Legal Reasoning 
 
Level 3 consists of semi-autonomous automation for 
AI legal reasoning.  
 
Examples of this notion encompassing semi-
autonomous automation would include the use of 
Knowledge-Based Systems (KBS) for legal reasoning, 
the use of Machine Learning and Deep Learning 
(ML/DL) for legal reasoning, and so on. 
 
Today, such automation tends to exist in research 
efforts or prototypes and pilot systems, along with 
some commercial legal technology that has been 
infusing these capabilities too.  
 
2.1.5 Level 4: Domain Autonomous for AI 
Legal Reasoning 
 
Level 4 consists of domain autonomous computer-
based systems for AI legal reasoning. 
 
This level reuses the conceptual notion of Operational 
Design Domains (ODDs) as utilized in the 
autonomous vehicles and self-driving cars levels of 
autonomy, though in this use case it is being applied to 
the legal domain [15] [17] [18]. Essentially, this 
entails any AI legal reasoning capacities that can 
operate autonomously, entirely so, but that is only able 
to do so in some limited or constrained legal domain. 
 
2.1.6 Level 5: Fully Autonomous for AI Legal 
Reasoning 
 
Level 5 consists of fully autonomous computer-based 
systems for AI legal reasoning. 
 
In a sense, Level 5 is the superset of Level 4 in terms 
of encompassing all possible domains as per however 
so defined ultimately for Level 4. The only constraint, 
as it were, consists of the facet that the Level 4 and 
Level 5 are concerning human intelligence and the 
capacities thereof. This is an important emphasis due 
to attempting to distinguish Level 5 from Level 6 (as 
will be discussed in the next subsection) 
 
It is conceivable that someday there might be a fully 
autonomous AI legal reasoning capability, one that 
encompasses all of the law in all foreseeable ways, 
though this is quite a tall order and remains quite 
aspirational without a clear cut path of how this might 
one day be achieved. Nonetheless, it seems to be 
within the extended realm of possibilities, which is 
worthwhile to mention in relative terms to Level 6. 
 
 
2.1.7 Level 6: Superhuman Autonomous for AI 
Legal Reasoning 
 
Level 6 consists of superhuman autonomous 
computer-based systems for AI legal reasoning. 
 
In a sense, Level 6 is the entirety of Level 5 and adds 
something beyond that in a manner that is currently ill-
defined and perhaps (some would argue) as yet 
unknowable. The notion is that AI might ultimately 
exceed human intelligence, rising to become 
superhuman, and if so, we do not yet have any viable 
indication of what that superhuman intelligence 
consists of and nor what kind of thinking it would 
somehow be able to undertake. 
 
Whether a Level 6 is ever attainable is reliant upon 
whether superhuman AI is ever attainable, and thus, at 
this time, this stands as a placeholder for that which 
might never occur. In any case, having such a 
placeholder provides a semblance of completeness, 
doing so without necessarily legitimatizing that 
superhuman AI is going to be achieved or not. No such 
claim or dispute is undertaken within this framework. 
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3 Next Eras and Autonomous AI Legal 
Reasoning 
 
As outlined in Section 1, make the assumption that 
there are three eras of American law and that they 
have been appropriately and indubitably identified and 
correctly typified.  
 
See Figure B-1 for a visual illustration of the three 
eras. 
 
The logical questions that naturally flow from those 
three presumed eras consists of: 
• What will be the fourth era? 
• When will the fourth era begin (or has it 
already)? 
• What is the basis for asserting there will be a 
fourth era? 
• How will the fourth era be differentiated from 
the prior eras? 
• To what degree does legal formalism partake in 
a fourth era? 
• And so on. 
 
There have been various proffered proposals about a 
fourth era. None of the postulated fourth eras has 
seemed to gain traction, as yet. This would appear to 
leave open for the time being the possibility of 
considering the nature and significance of a fourth era.  
Presumably, we are either not in a fourth era, or we 
might be in a fourth era and are generally unaware that 
we are.  
 
For those that might believe it folly or valueless to 
speculate about a fourth era, this kind of matter is 
actually of both a notable theoretical and practical 
significance. By being able to anticipate the fourth era, 
we might collectively as a society and especially 
within the legal field be able to prepare accordingly for 
what is to come, along with the added potential of 
shaping or altering course if the emergent fourth era 
seems untoward or otherwise undesirable. For legal 
practitioners, knowing what the fourth era constitutes 
could aid significantly in their training and attention, 
and be a crucial harbinger of what the practice of law 
is coming to possibly become. 
 
Consider two especially noted propositions for the 
possible fourth era, which are respectively known as 
the Age of Consent [7] and the other referred to as the 
Age of Information [44]. Both were proposed at 
approximately the same time and of relatively recent 
note (doing so around the year 2015). 
 
A proposed fourth era coined as the Age of Consent 
was postulated by Bobbitt [7]: “As we enter the Age of 
Consent, the era of a new, already emerging 
constitutional order that puts the maximization of 
individual choice at the pinnacle of public policy, it 
would be well to appreciate the structuring role for 
choice that American law has always provided. Far 
from obviating the need for our consciences, our laws 
structure a necessary role for them. That highly 
structured role is reflected in representative 
government (rather than plebiscites), in the 
composition of juries (rather than mobs, even when 
they form over the Internet rather than outside a jail), 
in the belief in liberal education (rather than 
indoctrination), in the responsibility of judges and 
lawyers to shape as well as defend the Constitution 
that gives them unique power. Those structures will be 
strictly scrutinized in this era, as they should be. How 
else will these habits and practices find defenders 
unless they are convinced, after rigorous examination, 
that this way of structuring choice is worthy of 
defense?” 
 
Another proposed fourth era is called the Age of 
Information, postulated by McGinnis and Wasick [44]: 
“Today we inhabit the Age of Information and this age 
is creating a new synthesis for the structure of law. If 
the Age of Faith required formalism to regulate the 
legal world, the Age of Information, like the Age of 
Anxiety, accepts that many factors may influence the 
law. But the Age of Information, like the Age of Faith, 
has greater confidence in creating legal clarity. Both 
the Age of Information and the Age of Faith have their 
gods of legal order, but if the god of the Age of Faith 
was formalism, today’s god is computable realism. 
The rise of computable standards and dynamic rules 
will be this age’s contribution to legal expression.” 
 
See Figure B-2 for a visual illustration indicative of 
the fourth eras postulated. 
 
An intriguing and potentially co-existent matter entails 
the advent of autonomous AI Legal Reasoning 
(AILR), as outlined generally in the prior section of 
this paper. Consider whether the emergence of 
autonomous AILR will be an element of the fourth era, 
or whether it is conceivable that autonomous AILR 
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would be more than merely an ingredient and 
essentially constitute the namesake of a fourth era.  
 
In the Age of Information, there is ample indication of 
the importance of AI in the law and how it will be a 
considered element. The Age of Consent does not 
directly tie the role of AI and the law into its depiction, 
though it is possible to discern underlying aspects that 
could be construed within the framework indicated. 
An additional argument to be made is that perhaps, if 
we are already in a fourth era, it could be that the rise 
of autonomous AILR might be a noteworthy 
contributor to the fourth era and ultimately be the 
forerunner or instigator of a fifth era. 
 
See Figure B-3 for a visual illustration of these 
possibilities. 
 
Aligning the Section 2 indication of the levels of 
autonomy for AI Legal Reasoning, it is instructive to 
consider the impacts per each of the levels thereof. 
 
See Figure B-4 for an indication of the LoA AILR 
with the added indication accordingly. 
 
In brief, the levels and the alignment to the eras appear 
to consist of: 
• Level 0: In Eras 1, 2, 3+ 
• Level 1: In Eras 3, (4+) 
• Level 2: In Eras 3, (4+) 
• Level 3: In Eras 3, {4+) 
• Level 4: Shape Eras 4 or 5 
• Level 5: Define Eras 4 or 5 
• Level 6: Be Eras 5 or 6 
 
Here is an overview explanation associated with these 
stated possibilities. 
 
At Level 0, the lack of computer-based automation 
was certainly the case during the first era, and during 
the second era too. During the third era, there are still 
ongoing examples of the lack of computer-based 
automation being utilized. It is presumably the case 
that the law will always be amenable to the nonuse of 
automation, thus the indication of “3+” meaning from 
the third era onward. An outstretched case can be 
made that there will be a future era during which 
computer-based automation will be so pervasive and 
so crucial that the law cannot exist or be undertaken 
without it, but this seems an outlier consideration at 
this time. 
 
At Level 1, the advent of simple computer-based 
automation emerged in the third era and continues to 
this day. Presumably, this will continue into the fourth 
era and beyond. It would though seem that Level 1 is 
substantively lacking in the sense that it would not 
drive or materially spark a shift into a fourth era and 
thus the “(4+)” is used to indicate as such. 
 
At Level 2, the advent of advanced computer-based 
automation also emerged in the third era and continues 
to this day. Presumably, this will continue into the 
fourth era and beyond. It would though seem that 
Level 2 is substantively lacking in the sense that it 
would not drive or materially spark a shift into a fourth 
era and thus the “(4+)” is used to indicate as such. 
 
At Level 3, the advent of semi-autonomous AILR 
automation is gradually appearing in the prevailing 
third era and continues to this day. Presumably, this 
will continue into the fourth era and beyond. It would 
though seem that Level 3 is substantively lacking in 
the sense that it would not drive or materially spark a 
shift into a fourth era, despite whatever otherwise 
innovative prototypes or tryouts are launched, and thus 
the “(4+)” is used to indicate as such. 
 
If Level 4 can be achieved, this would seem to be a 
notable basis for shaping or possibly even instigating 
the next era, whether it be the fourth era or a fifth era.  
 
If Level 5 can be achieved, this would seem to be of 
such a transformative facet that it would dramatically 
define a fourth or fifth era.  
 
If Level 6 can be achieved, this would be an even 
more momentous transformative facet, perhaps driving 
a fifth or sixth era. 
 
 
3.1 Meta-Characteristics of Eras 
 
This subsection introduces a strawman set of meta-
characteristics that might be used to aid in delineating 
and identify the eras.  
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These five core facets are proffered: 
• Distinctive 
• Substantive 
• Observable 
• Paradigmatic 
• Explainable 
 
See Figure B-5 for a visual illustration of these core 
facets. 
 
Consider a brief explanation for each of the meta-
characteristics, covering each of the key foundations 
for the application of each one: 
 
• Distinctiveness entails that an era, regardless of 
sequence and whether already existent or still 
inexistent, showcases boundaries that can be 
distinctly identified, allowing us to realize that 
the era exists. Without distinctiveness, an 
alleged era would be indistinguishable 
presumably from the prior era, being no more 
than a blur or presumed extension of that era, 
and therefore could not demonstrably and 
verifiably be claimed as an era. 
 
• Substantive refers to the era being of a 
convincing magnitude and substance to 
warrant the era moniker. If a proposed era was 
distinctive but without sufficient import or 
degree, it would be readily arguable whether it 
truly standalone as an era or might be a 
momentary aberration in the existing 
prevailing era.  
 
• Observable refers to the era being detectible, 
such that if there is no means to discern that 
the era exists, it would be presumably 
imaginary and thusly suspect to being counted 
as real or notable.  
 
• Paradigmatic refers to the aspect that an era 
would presumably need to fit within the 
paradigm associated with what eras are 
contended to be composed of. This is not to 
suggest that an era might breakaway from the 
existent paradigm, which certainly could be 
the case, though generally it is assumed that 
the collectively accepted paradigm is 
sufficient (obviously, a new paradigm is 
always worthy of consideration).  
 
• Finally, it is suggested that an era would need to 
be explainable, which involves being able to 
provide a rationale and explication of why an 
era is thought to exist. This is not an especially 
necessary condition, since it is conceivable 
that an era exists and has resisted being 
naturally explained, but nonetheless it can be 
argued that without a sufficient explanation 
for the era it is unlikely to gain consensus for 
acknowledging its existence and substance. 
 
The meta-characteristics are not numbered since to do 
so might imply prioritization or ranking. They are each 
of their own merit. In addition, they are a collective 
set, without which any individual one would be less 
capable and certainly lacking in robustness to indicate 
the entire arch or form of an era. 
 
 
3.2 Legal Formalism As Era Triggering Mechanism 
 
In this subsection, further discussion about the role of 
legal formalism is undertaken.  
 
As mentioned in Section 1, there are assertions that 
legal formalism is at the underpinning of the three 
eras. See Figure B-6 for a visual illustration of the 
legal formalism underpinning facets. 
 
Consider this proffered explanation of the legal 
formalism underlaying role in the eras matters: 
 
• It has been speculated that legal formalism 
began with an initial and yet somewhat 
distracted driving force in the making of Era 1, 
and thus on a spectrum of legal formalism 
ranging from none to some maximal amount, 
there is an arrow shown in Figure B-6 for Era 
1 indicating this forward movement in the 
direction towards greater adoption of legal 
formalism during the first era. 
 
• In the second era, it has been speculated in the 
literature that legal formalism took an even 
greater dominance, and thus in Figure B-6 for 
Era 2 there is an additional arrow further 
extending the legal formalism on the spectrum 
provided.  
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• For the third era, it has been speculated that 
legal formalism encountered retreatment, 
giving way to legal realism. As such, the 
arrow of legal formalism for Era 3 in Figure 
B-6 is shown beneath the earlier two and 
indicative of a lessening on the legal 
formalism spectrum. 
 
• Regarding a fourth era, if the breakpoints or 
triggering mechanism that demarks the eras is 
indeed the legal formalism factor, presumably 
a divergent rise or lessening of legal 
formalism might be an earmark for the fourth 
era. This is not to assert that legal formalism is 
a cause-and-effect of the eras, which it might 
be, or it might be an indicator that correlates 
thereto, and thus this should be interpreted 
cautiously. In any case, if there was a 
substantive boost to legal formalism, perhaps 
this would be a sign or signal of a revival and 
might necessitate ascertaining whether a new 
era has emerged (see Figure B-6, Era 4). 
Likewise, if there was a substantive lessening 
of legal formalism, perhaps this would be a 
sign or signal of the obviating of legal 
formalism and might necessitate ascertaining 
whether a new era has emerged (see Figure B-
6, Era 4). 
 
Note that this depiction is merely an invigorating 
means to conceptualize the American law era shifts, 
and not intended to be a prescriptive or otherwise 
determinative indicator regarding the eras. 
 
 
4 Additional Considerations and Future Research 
 
As earlier indicated, legal scholars have postulated that 
three eras of American law have occurred to-date, 
consisting in chronological order of the initial Age of 
Discovery, the Age of Faith, and then the Age of 
Anxiety. Though there appears to be substantive 
consensus and acceptance of the three eras, there is the 
possibility that some other means of stratifying the 
history of American law could provide a new set of 
eras.  
 
In any case, assuming that the three eras are the 
prevailing viewpoint, the open question of what is the 
fourth era remains available for ongoing discussion 
and debate. There is no consensus in the literature as 
yet on what the fourth era is, and nor whether the 
fourth era has already begun or will instead emerge in 
the future. This paper has examined the potential 
impacts due to the advent of autonomous Artificial 
Intelligence Legal Reasoning (AILR) on the question 
of the next era, including whether such AILR will be 
an element of a fourth era or a driver of a fourth, fifth, 
or perhaps sixth era of American law.  
 
Also, a set of meta-characteristics about the means of 
identifying a legal era changeover have been 
introduced, along with an innovative discussion of the 
role entailing legal formalism versus legal realism in 
the emergence of the American law eras. 
 
Future research is needed to explore in greater detail 
the manner and means by which AI-enablement will 
occur in the law along with the potential for both 
positive and adverse consequences. Autonomous 
AILR is likely to materially impact the eras of 
American law, including as a minimum playing a 
notable or potentially pivotal role in the next era(s), 
and having the possibility of shaping and instigating 
future eras altogether. 
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